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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~TATE

OF UTAH,
Plaiutiff and Rrsj){)Jiderzt,
Case
No. 8226

-YS.-

CHARLES LEE :MITCHELL,
Drfc nd ant und Appellant.

Respondent's Brief
PHELil\IINARY STATE:NIENT
Defendant was charged with the murder of Fred
Martin in Cache County, li tah, and was found guilty
of second degree murder after a one week trial commencing ~larch 1 :>, 19;14-. The trial court imposed sentence. From that judgment defendant takes this appeal.
Respondent feels that the statement of facts of
defendant's brief is not adequate. Defendant makes no
attempt to supply a summary of the proof. Such a summary is stated here, the attempt being to set down a
chronological narrative. In view of the verdict, the
1
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'·,,·,

·~

record is reviewed in a light favorahll' to respondent.
This brief adopts the page designation employed by
defendant: pages in the court reporter's transcript are
referred to as "B ______ "; pages in the record as "R ______ ".
Charles Lee :Mitchell, the defendant and appellant, is
referred to throughout as ''defendant.''

Fred :Martin's body was found in North Logan,
Cache County, on the morning of Oct. 28, 1953, at the
side of a little-used country lane (B. 22). Defendant
was arrested on a Greyhound bus at Bozeman, }\fontana,
on Oct. 30th, in connection with the crime. (B. 210).
Defendant and .Martin worked in the potato fields
near Blackfoot, Idaho (B. 453-4). Defendant owned,
prior to the crime, a .25 calibre Star automatic pistol.
He pawned this gun on Oct. 7, 1953 at Sam's Loan Company in Pocatello, and redeemed it from pledge on Oct.
22nd, receiving it back (B. 238-9). On Oct. 26th, at 2:30
a.m., defendant participated in an altercation growing
out of a dice game in an upstairs room of the ~ ew Tourist
Hotel in Blackfoot (B. 262, 459). The hotel-keeper was
aroused by sounds of running, and a beer bottle hitting
the bottom of the stairs (B. 262). He then heard a shot,
opened his door, and saw defendant standing on the
stairs with his automatic in his hand (B. 262). In
cleaning up the following morning, the hotel-keeper found
a spent .25 calibre cartridge case on the stairs (B. 264).
On Oct. 30th the bullet slug fired during the fracas was
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found imbedded in the carpeting of the stairs (B. 285).
This slug, and the cartridge case, figure importantly in
the subsequent testimony.
Defendant and 1\iartin drove to Ogden for a holiday,
arriving on the morning of Oct. 27th (B. 93). They
spent the day there, seeing several of defendant's acquaintances, among them Charles Williams (B. 93),
Herman Smith (B. 304), and _Mr. and 1\'Irs. DeWitt rraylor (B. 146, 167). Fred Martin, nicknamed "Pops", was
identified as being his companion that day (B. 94-5, 149,
170, 308). Defendant admitted the trip to Ogden, with
Martin (B. 489). l\Iartin had a sum of money: on Oct.
22nd, he offered his employer a loan with which to meet
the 60-75 man payroll (B. 274); Charles Williams saw
the bank roll in Ogden and described it as "quite a wad"
(B. 95) ; and Pops was described by defendant as
"loaded" (B. 94) and as "sticking" (i.e., had money)
(B. 108). Defendant, Charles Williams, and Herman
Smith discussed Pop's bank roll and tried to devise a
scheme to get it from him (B. 94, 108).
Defendant had his .25 calibre automatic ·with him
in Ogden (B. 98, 128, 150). Various descriptions of it
make it clear that it ·was the same gun which he pawned,
and which he used in the earlier shooting scrape in
Blackfoot. De Witt r:raylor described it as ''a little .25
automatic''; ''a little small gun with a thumb cock on
the hammer'' (B. 150). Mrs. Taylor called it ''a little
black gun with a little thing on the back side, looked like
a trigger to me" (B. 168). A comparison 'vith the
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pawnbroker ·s description shows it to be the 8ame gun
(" ... it's about four or four and a half inches overall
length. It's an open hammer gun. You '11 find a lot of
automatics are hammerless. This is an open hammer.'')
(B. 238).
There is evidence that late in the evening Pops became drunk (B. 316), and there was some difficulty between him and defendant about the car keys (B. 97).
Defendant stated, about the keys, '' . . . that wm; his
business, it was his keys. I mean, he brought the old
man down and he'd take him back when he got ready
to go" (B. 97-8). At about 9 p.m., defendant, Pops, and
other friends were at De Witt Taylor's house at a party
(B. 98, 152). Defendant was heard hy DeWitt Taylor
to say, "We're going to leave sometime tonight. Going
back to Pocatello." (B. 153). ~irs. Taylor also heard
defendant say that" ... they were pulling out that night."
(B. 174). ~irs. Taylor thought that all the visitors at
the house left together (B. 171). :Mrs. Taylor was also
told by defendant that he had a $150 interest in ~1:artin's
Plymouth coupe "·hich they drove to Ogden (B. 170}.
Defendant and :~\lartin were seen together about 9:45
p.m. that night at a tavern by Herman Smith, whom defendant invited to go to Idaho with them (B. 307, 318);
Smith agreed to go, but was dissuaded hy other friends
(B. 307, 318).
The dead body of Fred Martin was found next
morning on a side road in North Logan, Utah (B. 22).
Death was caused by a bullet which entered the right
4
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side of Martin's neck and proceeded upwards, into the
brain (B. 34-5). Death was instantaneous (B. 42). The
examining doctor found also that Martin's skull had been
fractured by a blow with a blunt instrument (B. 38). The
skull fracture was aceompanied by hematoma, or a blood
clot, indicating that :Martin was struck on the head before
he was shot, since a hematoma does not form after
death (B. 39). rrhe doctor first examined the body at
11:40 a.m. on Oct. 27th, and was of the opinion, based
upon the progress of rigor mortis, that death occurred
about twelYe hours prior, with two hours lee\\'ay either
way (B. 33).
The black Plymouth coupe, 1941 model, bearing
Washington license plates, in which defendant and Pops
drove to Ogden, was found abandoned in Blackfoot the
same morning, Oct. 28th (B. 176), and was examined by
law enforcement officers the next day (B. 184). A spent
.2:J calibre cartridge case was found on the floor of the
car (B. 185). A piece of the car's seat cover, blood
stained, was cut out and sent to the F.B.I. laboratory
for analysis (B. 187-189). Witnesses Charles "\Villiams
and De Witt Taylor identified the car as being the one
which defendant and Martin had in Ogden (B. 99-100,
148).
Defendant also was in Blackfoot the early morning
of Oct. 28th. Before 7 a.m. the night clerk at the Grand
Hotel saw him come out of Room 7, and he paid her the
money for the following night's rent (B. 193). He apparently changed his mind, however, and left Blackfoot

5
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that day, despite the fact that his employer there in
Blackfoot owed him some money, tlw lath'r e\'idelll'l'
ha,·ing been admitted as tending to proYe flight (B. :n:n.
Defendant was seen in Idaho Falls on October 28th at 5
p.m. (B. 323). He there asked a friend to buy him some
gin, and in getting out the money he inadvertently exhibited some cartridges larger in size than .22s but
smaller than .45s (B. 323-4). Defendant at that time
also had a bus ticket to Butte, Montana (B. 324).
Defendant was picked up at 1:35 a.m. on October
30th at Bozeman, Montana (B. 209). In his suitcase were
five cartridges for a .25 calibre automatic (B. 218).
rrhe record establishes that the murder weapon was
the .25 calibre Star automatic which defendant redeemed
from pawn on Oct. 22nd, which he employed in the shooting scrape in Blackfoot on Oct. 25th, and which he had
in Ogden on the 27th. Microscopic ballistic tests proved
that the bullet slug taken from _Martin's brain (Exh. 6)
was fired by defendant's gun, the same gun that fired
the bullet slug in the Blackfoot hotel (B. 297). Microscopic examination of the shell casing found in the abandoned car proved that it bore the marks of defendant's
gun, the same gun that fired the shot in the Blackfoot
hotel (B. 297). The shell casings inYolved in the murder,
the hotel incident, and those found in defendant's suitcase, are products of the same manufacturer-Remington, and are all .25 calibre automatic bullets (B. 298-9).
The blood splotch on the seat cover of 1\iartin 's car was
human blood, of Group B (B. 290). The blood on l\iar6
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tin's trousers and tee shirt was also human blood, Group
B (B. 291). Human bloodstains were found on a shirt
and trousers taken from defendant's suitcase, and inside
the right hand pocket of another pair of defendant's
trousers, but the stains were too small to enable the
F.B.I. technician to make grouping tests (B. 291).
At the place .Martin's body was found, prints of
automobile tires showed ·where a car had pulled to the
edge of the road (B. 7:2). One of the feet of the dead
body lay out on the edge of the shoulder of the road,
and the rear tire of the automobile had passed over
the foot (B. 72). Plaster-of-paris casts were made of
the tire prints (B. 73) which were receivetl as Exhibits
10, 11, and 12 (B. 87). The officer who made the casts
was of the opinion that the tire marks matched the front
and rear tires on the right hand side of Martin's car
(B. 350-2). The clerk of this court has both the tires
and the casts, and the court, on examination, will be
able to match the casts with the appropriate tires.
The defendant's testimony is outlined briefly. He
admitted that he and l\Iartin spent the day in Ogden,
but says he gave Pops the car keys about 9 p.m. and
never saw him again (B. 504). Defendant claims he
stayed in Ogden with Herman Smith and others, leaving
them about 1 a.m. (B. 505). He then caught a freight
train to Pocatello (B. 507). He expressly denied DevVitt
Taylor's testimony about his automatic (B. 501); denied
Charles William's testimony about a scheme to get Pop's
bankroll, and about Williams having seen the gun (B.
7
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502); denied Herman Smith'~ testimony of having seen
the clip for the automatic, and of defendant's invitation
to leave Ogden with him and Pops (B. 506).
Defendant says he arrived at Pocatello about i-8
a.m. (B. 508) and hitched a ride to Blackfoot, arriving
9-10 a.m. (B. 509). He bought a bus ticket to Butte
(B. 510), then got n ticket to Denver (B. 517). He
denied the h'stimony of the Hight clerk of the Grand
Hotel in Blackfoot, Esther Scott, as to his having been
there before 7 a.m. (B. 511). l-Ie <lenied Earl \Villiam's
testimony that he had bullets in his pocket at 5 p.m. in
Idaho Falls (B. 512). The blood on his clothes, he says,
resulted from a cut on his hand about Oct. 1st (B. 526).
He admitted that the blood-stained trousers (Exh. 39)
'vere worn on the Ogden excursion, and also that a blue
shirt--presumably Exh. :~2-was worn to Ogden (B. 543).
Defendant's version of the hotel shooting fracas
was that he did not fire a gun, that the only gun he held
was a .32 six-shooter which he knocked out of a .Mexican's hand (B. 541). He explained possession of the
.25 calibre bullets by saying he had had them ever since
1949, when he owned a gun of that calibre (B. 524).
Defendant testified he got the .25 calibre Star automatic from Pancho, a :Mexican, who pawned it to defendant for a loan in connection with a crap game.
Defendant pawned it to Sam's Loan Company, redeemed
it, then returned it to Pancho and never saw it again

8
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(B. 489). On rebuttal, Herman Smith stated he saw
defendant with a .2S calibre automatic of the same
general appearance in September, in Boise and Pocatello
(B. 668-9). Audrey Baird, employed in a Boise pawn
shop, identified Exhibits 62 and 63, indicating that defendant had also pawned a .23 calibre Star automatic
in September, and redeemed it Oct. 3rd (B. 680-7). Defendant thereupon resumed the stand and admitted this
other pawnshop transaction (B. 693), and explained that
he got the same gun from the same :Mexican in another
gambling transaction, while they were in Caldwell, Ida.,
topping onions (B. 694).
Several defense 'Witnesses corroborated defendant's
testimony that he was in Ogden between 9 p.m. and 1:00
a.m. on Oct. 27th.
Defendant's story about having jumped aboard a
refrigerator car on the train (B. 580), 'vas rebutted
with proof that the particular train, #3816, was without
any refrigerator car (B. 647). Defendant's claim that
he jumped the train at the point the tracks divide (Cecil
Junction) near the ·watchman's shanty by the jungle
(B. 575-6), was rebutted with proof that #3816 went out
the main passenger line, some two blocks away (B. 638).
ST A'rE1\fENT OF POINTS
POINT I.

THE

1

CO:\IPL~\1~'1

\YAS LAWFUL.
9
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VE~TTE

WAS CORRECTLY LAID IN CACHE

COUNTY.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADl\11'1,rriNG EXHIBITS 2, 8, AND 9.

POINT IV.
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE OF rrHE
WITNESS CLAUDE HOLI\IES WAS CORRECT IN
THAT (A) THE RULE EXCLUDING PROOF OF
ANOTHER OFFENSE IS NOT INVOLVED; (B)
PROOF OF MOTIVE IS ADl\IISSIBLE; (C) VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSION RULE WAS NOT A
BAR TO HIS TESTIMONY.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT ON ALL INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS
CORRECT.

POINT VI.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS rrHE VERDICT.

10
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ARGli~IEN"T

POINT I.
THE <j<>MPLAINT \VAS LAWFUL.
Defendant's first point is directed at the complaint
filed before the Logan City Judge, Jesse P. Rich. The
document appears in the record at R. 2. Defendant's
argument is that it was approved by the District Attorney rather than the County Attorney, and is therefore void. rrhe proposition is apparently based on Sec.
77-12-1, U.C.A. 1953, which defendant cites. rrhe section reads:
When a verified complaint is made before a
magistrate charging the commission of a crime
or public offense, he must, if satisfied therefrom
that the offense complained of has been committec1 and that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused committed it, issue a warrant for his arrest; but \vhen the magistrate
before whom the complaint is made is a justice
of the peace, before issuing the warrant, the
complaint, if made l>y any person other than the
county attorney of the count~', and the evidence
taken hy such magistrate relating to the offense
charged, must be suhmitted to such county attorney, and he must examine into the charge and
enter either his approval or disapproval of the
issuance of a warrant upon such complaint. If
the ('onnt~, attontey disapproves, no warrant shall
be issued, but if he approves the issuance of a
warrant, such magistrate shall proceed accordingly; provided, that when it appears from the
complaint or evidence submitted to the magistrate
that the accused is likely to escape from the county
before such approval of the count!' attonH'Y can
be had, a \\'arrant may issue without the approval
11
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of the county attorney. X o justice of the peace
shall receive any fees or allowanees whatever for
any act done or services rendered in a criminal
action or proreeding commenced or prosecuted in
disregard of the provisions of this section.
The section does not apply to this case. "\Vhat the
statute says is that where a complaint is heard by a
justice of the peace, the County Attorney must also
approve before an arrest is ordered. The reason for
the 8tatute is that justices of the peace are not required
by law to be lawyers, as are all other magistrates (Supreme Court Justices, by Art. VIII, ~ 2, Utah Const.;
District Judges, by _Art. VIII, § 3, Utah Const.; City
Judges, by Sec. 78-4-8, U.C.A. 1953). The legislature
apparently thought it appropriate that an additional
check be placed upon the exerrise of the power of a
magistrate by a justice of the peace.
The complaint here involved was sworn to before
the City Judge of Logan; it was not made before a
justice of the peace. This means that neither the District
Attorney nor the County Attorney need have approved
the complaint. This is the view taken by the trial judge
(B. 358), and it seems clearly rorrect.
Respondent contends further that the District Attorney has power to sign in the County Attorney's stead,
if the latter is not available. Such authorization is contained in Sec. 67-7-4, U.C.A. 1953, which reads:
The district attorney shall, when it does not
conflict with other official duties, attend to all
legal business required of him in his district by
1~
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the attorney general, without charge, when the
interests of the state are involved. All the duties
and powers of public prosecutor shall be assumed
and disrharged by the district attorney, except in
cases of prosecutions for misdemeanors, and preliminary examinations before justices of the peace,
but the district attorney may, whenever he deems
it necessar.\', appear and prosecute for misdemeanors, and in preliminary examinations before
justire~ of the peace and other magistrates.
Further, the statute at issue is a part of Ch. 12, of Title
77, which chapter deals with the warrant of arrest and
not at all with what is required for a valid complaint.
Defendant has not referred to Ch. 11, the chapter in
the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with complaints.
The question raised simply goes to the propriety of the
warrant. The validity of the complaint, and jurisdiction
of the defendant and the cause, are unaffected.
Xeither 1'-J'tate c. Oreenc, 78 lT. 380, 6 P. ~d 177, nor
State r. Jlorse, ~7 U. 336, 73 P. 739, cited by defendant,
reaches the proposition ·which defendant urges, and
neither case contains even a comment about it one way
or another. 1'-,'tate r. J.ll arrey, 23 U. 273, 64 P. 764; State
r. Beddo, 22 U. 432, 63 P. 96, and State r. Blfkcr, 23 U.
276, 64 P. 1118, are not in point. Those cases each involved a prosecution commenced by an information filed
by the district attorney pursuant to a statutory procedure
later held to be uHconstitutional.
Fullingin v. State (Okla. 1912), 123 P. 558, 1s an

Oklahoma bootlegging case cited and quoted by defendants. There the rounty attorney had signed, in blank, a
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

number of informations. A clerk would fill thL'Sl' in, tlw11
issue a warrant of arrest, without the knowledge of the
county judge or the county attorney. Such a proredure
was of course held improper. The casP is not remotely
like the case at bar, however.
POINT II.
VENUE \VAS CORRECrrLY LAID IN CA(a-IE
COUNTY.
Defendant's second point charges error in that there
was failure to prove venue. The claim is that there was
no evidence that the fatal shot was fired in Cache
County.
At the outset, respondent disagrees with defendant's
statement of the relevant law. In some states, the rule
is that venue must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Gregor, 359 Ill. 402, 194 N.E. 550; State v .
.Ll!iller, 133 Ore. 256, 289 P. 1063; Bridges r. State, 72 Ga.
App. 390, 33 S.E. 2d 850; State v. 1Vicrlcnfeld, 229 Wis.
563, 282 N.W. 621; 1Vlayes v. State, 22 Ala. App. 316, 115
S. 291; State v. Schroyer, 66 Ohio App. 30, 31 N.E. 2d
469.
On the other hand, a mere preponderance of evidenre
has been held sufficient to establish Yenue in Stribling
v. State, 171 Ark. 184, 284 S.\V. 38; Skipper r. State, 114
Fla. 312, 153 S. 853; People v. Vinceuc,io, 71 Cal. App.
2d, 361, 162 P. 2d 650; Dar is v. State, 75 Okla. Cr. 220,
130 P. 2d 111; Barragau l'. State, 141 Tex. Cr. 12, 147
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S.W. 2d 234; Stillson v. State, 181 Tenn. 172, 180 S.W.
2d 883, and State ~·. Kinka.id, 69 Wash. 273, 124 P. 684.
In Kentucky, ''slight'' proof is enough. Commonwealth
r. Ducal!, 220 Ky. 771, 295 S.W. 1047; Gee c. Commontcealth, 263 l{y. 808, 94 S.W. 2d 17.
The better reasoned cases adopt the view that venue
1s not an element of a crime in the same sense that
malice, for example, is an element of a murder, and
therefore hold that venue need not be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. A California court in People v.
Harkness (1942), 124 P. 2d 85, has this to say on the
subject (124 P. 2d, at 88):
As was said by this court in People v. Carter,
10 Cal. App. 2d 387, 52 P. 2d 294, 295, "The state
gives no assurance to its feloniously insubordinate
citizens that the venue of their crimes will be fixed
beyond a reasonable doubt; that doctrine applies
only to the issue of guilt. People v. :McGill, [10
Cal. App. 2d 155, at page 159], 51 P. 2d 433;
Underhill on Criminal Evidence, vol. I, § 36, p. 45.
The defendant and appellant, therefore, is in no
position to complain because the location of the
offense was not established to a degree of certainty more to his liking."
In all the states, regardless of the required quantum of
proof, circumstantial evidence of \'enue is sufficient, and
direct evidence is not required. This is the Utah rule.
,'-,'fate c. Grceuc, 38 U. 389, 113 P. 181.
This court dealt with a venue problem in State v.
Greene, 38 U. 389, 115 P. 181, which was an adultery
prosecution tried in Sanpete County. rrhere was no
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direct proof of venue. The court held, however, that
venue could be inferred from this evidence: defendant
and the girl lived in Mt. Pleasant, in the same house
with defendant's wife; the parties had not left the county
during the critical period except for brief visits. The
girl left for California where a baby was born. There
she made affidavit that defendant was the father, and
that sexual intercourse had taken place in l\1t. Pleasant.
On being shown the affidavit defendant said, "I don't
believe the baby is mine." This court construed tlu~t
statement as being an admission of the intercourse, at
Mt. Pleasant, and hence an admission of venue. It should
be noted that the girl's affidavit was hearsay, and was
admitted only for the limited purpose of forming a basis
for defendant's admission. The substance of the affidavit was not considered as to the venue problem.
In State v. Marasco, 81 U. 325, 17 P. 2d 919, venue
was established on slighter evidence. The charge was
arson. The proof was that the building was: "located
in the outskirts of Helper, not in the main business part
of town''; that the defendant's place of business was
"the west side of Helper, Bryner subdivision." The
finding of venue ·was affirmed. This court reasoned that
judicial knowledge placed Helper in Carbon Countythis despite the fact that_ the jury were not so instructed.
See also State v. Campbell (Utah, 1949), 208 P. 2d
530.
Based upon the foregoing authorities, it i~ submitted that the rules controlling the ,·enue of criminal
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trials in Utah are: (1) that venue may be established
by a preponderance of evidence, and need not be shown
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) that venue may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence and need not be
shown by direct proof.

It should be noted that there is present here a jury
finding of venue. A reading of the transcript indicates
that defendant ~s counsel made this issue sharply clear
to the jury. Defendant was found guilty under Instruction Twelve (R. 109) which defined second degree
murder. The trial court by this instruction, and by Instruction Seventeen, imposed upon the prosecutor the
burden of proving venue beyond a reasonable doubt,
which in respondent's view was more than what the law
requires. The only remaining question is whether the
finding is within the bounds of reasonable inference.
Defendant makes much of Dr. Daines' theory that
~Iartin was killed at a place other than where he was
found (B. 41, 45). The doctor's evidence indicates that
his idea was based upon the absence of blood on the
ground. He testified (B. 45, line 8) :

Q...:\nd what led you to believe that [:Martin
was killed elsewhere] ?
"\. Because there -,vas no blood on the ground,
and the wound he received, there \vould have had
to be considerable hleeding.
Q. You dic1 not observe any hlood on the
ground!
A. No blood on the ground whatever.
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The significance of this passage is that it shows that
the basis of his conjecture \Yas an observable php•ieal
fact-the presence or absence of blood. The validity of
the doctor's conjecture depends upon the validity of his
factual observation.
The preponderance of evidence (as the jury endently believed) is that there was blood on the ground.
Deputy Rowley said that when the body was moved therr
was blood on the ground, under Martin's head and chest
(B. 60). Deputy Sorenson observed a 4 to 5 inch spot
of blood on the leaves and dirt directly under the wound
(B. 72). Deputy Rowley also testified that he dug some
soil from underneath 1fartin's body which had blood
on it (B. 345). This witness stuck by his story despite
defense counsel's attempt to get him to say that it may
have been red paint, or rabbit's blood (B. 346). The
soil was received as Exh. 41.
It is to be noted that these witnesses had a better
opportunity to examine the premises than did Dr. Daines,
whose function was simply to examine the body. The
law is clear that a lay witness can distinguish, and testify
about, blood stains. 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 887.
Taken altogether, the evidence supports a finding
that the killing occurred in Cache County. That was
where the body was found, and the jury could well have
considered the natural inclination of one who has killed
a man, and who has custody of the victim's car, "-ith the
victim in it, to get rid of the body quickly. The poor
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concealment of the body, and the running over its foot
with the car, indicate that it was gotten rid of with some
haste. rrhe body was not carried for any great distance
after death because it was still bleeding when it was
thrown where it was found. Death occurred instantaneously. This is sufficient evidence for a valid jury finding
of venue.

Marion u. State (Neb., 1886), 29 N.W. 911, holds that
the place where a body is found is a factor from which
may be inferred the locality of the homicide. There, the
defendant and deceased left Kansas "·ith a team and
wagon, which belonged to deceased but which defendant
was buying from him. Defendant had bought and repaired a pistol to take on the trip. rrhey were seen in
Gage County, Nebraska, and from there they ''went
west". Defendant returned to Kansas within a short
time with the team and wagon, wearing some of deceased's clothes. He said he had been in Kansas. Deceased's body was later found in Gage County, Nebraska,
with a bullet in the skull cavity.
To defendant's requested instruction that proof of
the killing in Gage County had to be shown beyond
reasonable douht, the trial court added:
But the place where the remains were found,
if found at all, may be taken into consideration,
together with all other evidence, in fixing the
locality of the homicide, if there was a homicide.
The full instruction, and the finding of venue, were affirmed.
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In Commonwealth r. Costley (:L\Iass., 1875 ), 118 :Mas~.
1, defendant shot Julia Ha\Ykes, tied a carriage robe
around her head, and weighted the body \Yith n 24 lb.
tailor's goose tied around the neck. The body was deposited near a bridge in Fore River, Norfolk Comtty,
about 2¥2 to 31f2 miles from the next county. One of the
court's syllabi states:
The finding of a human body, with marks upon
it of injuries sufficient to cause death, in a river
in the heart of a county, in such a situation and
condition as to show that it must have been
thrown there by the hand of man and not borne
there by the force of the stream or current, is
sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the
homicide was committed in that county.
In People
court stated:

1.;.

Latona, 2 Cal. 2d 714, 43 P. 2d 260, the

Appellant's final point is that the venue was
not proved, and it is suggested that the murder
might as well have been committed in Arizona
and the body brought to where it was found. The
coagulated blood on the ground underneath the
head of deceased dispels the suggestions that the
deceased was killed at some remote place, and the
point is therefore without merit.
·It is submitted that the evidence of venue detailed
abO\'e is sufficient basis for the jury's finding. The
proof is stronger than in the cited cases. The argument
of defendant is a dangerous argument. The contention,
essentially, comes do·wn to this, that since no c~'e-witness
saw where defendant killed ~Inrtin, defendant must go
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free. Plainly, the law should not be so helpless, and
respondent believes that it is not. Defendant's complaint
about improper venue is not justified.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS 2, 8, AND 9.
In his Point III, defendant complains about the
admission of Exhibits 2, 8, and 9, which are papers pertaining to the title of Fred Martin's automobile. The
papers were found in .Martin's wallet. Defendant's
argument is that the presumption of ownership arising
from ~1artin's possession of the papers is over-borne by
the presumption of innocence which favors defendant.
Defendant's objection is not well taken. The ownership
of the automobile was not at issue. What was sought to
be proved was simply that the man in whose wallet the
papers were found was named Fred Martin. The papers
in his wallet are perfectly admissible for that purpose.
Defendant's citation to 16 C.J. 542, Sec. 1033, deals
with problems arising in criminal cases where some
presumption comes into operation which conflicts with
the presumption of innocence. In view of the fact that
there is no presumption l1ere respecting ·l\Iartin 's guilt
or innocence, respondent cannot see how the citation is
helpful.

Smith u. Hansotl, 34 U. 171, 96 P. 1087, and State u.
Jlartin, 49 U. 346, 164 P. 500, are also cited by defendant.
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Those cases involve the admission of samples of a witness's handwriting as a standard of comparison with
other handwriting of disputed authenticity. The easps
are not in point.
At all events, these papers are but one minor item
in a mass of proof as to ~1artin 's identity. Exhibit 1, a
photograph of the murdered man, was identified by Jesse
R. Kyle. Defendant himself, as a witness, identified tht>
same photograph and admitted that he and" Pops" were
in Ogden together (B. 489). Charles Williams, De\Vitt
Taylor, and Herman Smith also identified ~1artin hy
the use of the photograph of the body. Respondent is
at a loss to see how admission of the evidence complained
about in this point could have any prejudicial effect upon
the result of the trial or the outcome of this appeal.
POINT IV.
ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE
WITNESS CLAUDE HOLMES WAS CORRECT IN
THAT (A) THE RULE EXCLUDING PROOF OF
ANOTHER OFFENSE IS NOT INVOLVED; (B)
PROOF OF MOTIVE IS ADMISSIBLE; (C) VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSION RULE WAS NOT A
BAR TO HIS TESTIMONY.
Defendant assigns as error the admission of evidence that he was involved in an altercation arising out
of a diee game in a Blackfoot hotel. During the fraras
defendant fired his pistol at Emmet Jones. This proof
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permitted a showing that a bullet fired from defendant's
gun killed Fred .Martin. Defendant complains that this
amounts merely to proof of a collateral offense which is
not admissible on the trial of this crime.
rrhere is a rule of law that a prosecutor cannot prove
one crime merely by showing commission of another
unconnected crime. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 682.
But this rule is not applicable here. There is an exception to the rule which is as well established as is the
rule itself. 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 683, reads in
part:
rrhe general rule of exclusion does not apply
where the evidence of another crime tends directly
or fairly to pro,,e, or thro'v light on, accused's
guilt of the crime charged, or to connect him with
it, or to prove some particular element, or material fact in such crime; or where the two crimes
are logically related or connected, so that proof
of the other tends, or is necessary, to prove the
one charged, or is necessary to a complete account
thereof, as where they are so inseparable as to
constitute but one transaction or crime, or where
the extraneous crime forms part of a chain of
circumstantial evidence of guilt of the crime
charged; or whPre the evidence of other offenses
tends to illustrate, characterize, or explain the
act charged, when it is capable of more than one
construction; or where such evidence bears directly and materially on the question at issue, or
explains, or aids in the solution of, the crime
charged. Evidence which is otherwise competent
or relevant to establish accused's guilt of the
crime charged is not rendered inadmissible by
the fact that it incidentally proves or tends to
prove him guilty of another and distinct crime.
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Utah
State
71 U.
P. 2d

law is in accord with the textual math'r eitt>d.
v. Peterson, 83 U. 74, 27 P. 2d 20; State c. Bro·ll'u,
381, 266 P. 716. In State v. lVlares, 113 U. ~2;>, 192
861, this court stated:
We need say little about the third proposition
argued by appellant. rrhis assignmeut of error
raises the inadmissibility of the evidence showing
the commission of other crimes by the defendant.
With the possible exception of the stealing of the
Packard automobile in Denver, Colorado, all other
offenses were directly connected with and related
to the principal crime charged. The disposition
of the property of deceased, the forging of deceased's name to certain documents, and the
stealing and selling of the personal property are
admissible for many reasons. These facts and
circumstances are relevant to establish a motive
for the killing, to identify the defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime, to discredit defendant's
claim of killing in self-defense, and to show an
attempt on the part of defendant to conceal the
crime and to prevent an identification of the deceased. A relevant fact does not become incompetent because it may tend to establish another and
separate crime.

Respondent submits that the prior shooting fracas
is necessarily interwoven with proof of the case at bar.
The defendant is not entitled to diminish the amount of
competent testimony against him simply by multiplying
the number of his crimes.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in
permitting Claude Holmes to testify that ~\lartin offered
him a loan to meet his payroll. The argument appears
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to be that actually Martin's bank roll amounted only to
$25.00 and that it is not fair to defendant to impute to
him a moti\·c to rob and kill for such a small amount of
money.
rrhe proof indicates that the amount was larger.
\lm·tiu offered his bank roll as being nearly big enough
to meet a 60-75 man payroll. Charles Williams saw
l\Iartin with a big bankroll in Ogden. That defendant
thought it sizable enough to be attractive is evidenced
by the plans discussed in Ogden to get possession of it.
At bottom, defendant is here simply arguing conflicting
evidence. The problem of resolving conflicts of evidence
has been settled by the jury. The evidence outlined above
was admissible to show motive. T'he law is clear that
proof of motive, although not required, is proper. 20
Am. J nr., Evidence, Sec. 340. State c. Woods, 62 U. 397,
220 P. 215.
Defendant's final argument in Point IV is that error
"·as committed when Claude Holmes was permitted to
testify despite his violation of the exclusion role. Holmes
had talked to some witnesses for the defense after
Holmes himself had testified.
Holmes' conduct may have amounted to contempt,
but there ·was obviously no effect upon his testimony,
since he had already testified. The trial court's ruling
was sensible and practieal and well within discretion. In
matters of this kind the trial court haR broad discretion.
The rules governing such happenings are summarized
in 53 Am. J ur., Trial, Sec. 33, as follows:
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There is a sharp diversity of opinion as to
what shall be done when a witness who has Yiolated an order directing his exclusion from the
courtroom is presented. One view is that in such
a case it is within the sound discretion of the
trial court whether the testimony of such witness
shall be received, but that there may be such an
abuse of discretion in rejecting evidence as will
justify interference by an appellate court, and a
refusal to receive evidence where the party is
without fault may violate his constitutional right~.
To justify an interference with the reception of
such evidence, the case must be an extreme one.
Where a witness who has been put under the rule
remains in the courtroom after testifying, it is
discretionary whether he shall be permitted to
be recalled.
Another view is that a witness' violation of
the order of the court after being placed under
the rule will not alone disqualify him, and that
the court has no power to exclude his testimony
for this reason. These authorities hold that the
party calling the witness is entitled to his testimony in any event, notwithstanding the violation
of the rule.
A third view is that where a witness who has
been put under the rule violates the order of the
court without the consent, connivance, or procurement of the party calling him or of the counsel
representing such party, the witness is not thereby rendered incompetent to testify, and that the
party calling him cannot, on account of the Yiolation of the order without his fault, be rightfully
deprived of the testimony of such witness. Under
this view, if the party is at fault the evidence may
be excluded. In any event, to render the exclusion
of evidence prejudicial it must be made to appear
that the ·witness would have testified to a materia!
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fact. Of course, under any of the above rules a
disobedient witness may be punished for contempt
of court, and his disobedience may be considered
as affecting his credibility. Where it could not be
foreseen that a person in the courtroom who did
not observe an order excluding witnesses, would
be needed as a witness, it is proper to permit him
to be called to rebut testimony.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO INsrrRUCT ON ALL INCLUDED OFFENSES WAS
CORRECT.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not
instructing on all included offenses. Defendant appears
to argue that the whole record is speculative, and that if
the jury were permitted to speculate about the murder
charge, it should be permitted to speculate about all
included offenses.
Defendant's point simply amounts to an attack on
the sufficiency of the evidence. The answering argument
in this connection is taken up in Point VI of this brief.
Defendant virtually concedes that the evidence \Vould
not support a manslaughter charge; the proposition 1s
phrased negatively (page 37 of defendant's brief):
There is nothing in the evidence to indicate
that the deceased was not killed in a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion or that he was not
killed in self-defense, by whoever killed him.
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Utah law is clear that "'here the evidew:l' would not
support a finding of guilt of a lesser included offensl' the
trial court should not instruct on such included offenses.
State v. Mcwhinney, 43 U. 135, 134 P. 632; State t'.
Thompson, 110 U. 113, 170 P. 2d 153.
POINT VI.
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT.
Defendant outlines three factual issues which he
claims to be determinative, and as to which he claims
failure of proof. These points will be discussed in the
same order in which defendant takes them up.
Defendant argues first that there is no evidence as
to identification of the body. This proposition is discussed in Point III of this brief. The proof is not restated here. Defendant's own identification of the vi<'tim 's photograph, while on the witness stand, is a complete answer (B. 489).
Defendant's second contention is that there is no
proof that the place of the homicide was Cache County,
Utah. This is substantially a reargument of defendant's
Point II, and is answered in Point II of this brief.
Defendant also contends that the evidence does not
support the finding that he was the murderer. Respondent believes that when the ·whole record is examined
the court ·will emerge with a settled conviction of defendant's guilt. The proof shows an opportunity to kill,
a motive, a clear connection of defendant with the crime,
and flight. _l\Iartin was killed ·with defendant's gun, which
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defendant had with him only a few hours before the
crime. Defendant left Ogden with l\1:artin, having declared his intention to take Martin back to Blackfoot.
Proof that defendant and :Martin left Ogden about 10 :00
p.m. fits in perfectly with the time of the killing at North
Logan about midnight, in accordance with the medical
evidence. After the crime defendant drove to Blackfoot.
The time of defendant's brief stop at Blackfoot integrates with his abandonment of the Plymouth coupe
there that morning. The spent cartridge case found in
the automobile, the blood which is of the same blood
group as :Martin's, and the tire marks, show the involvement of the automobile in the crime. Defendant's flight
from Blackfoot meant that he abandoned his job, the
money owed him for back wages, and the automobile in
which he owned an interest. The trip to Denver, via
.:\fontana, was erratic and roundabout. The lame explanations of the blood on his clothing and the bullets in
his possession were understandably rejected by the jury.
Defendant's consciousness of his own guilt is unmistakably revealed by his actions.
That the jury reasonably could find that defendant
shot Fred Martin is demonstrated above. The remaining
element of murder, malice aforethought, is implicit in
the nature of this crime. Defendant shot Martin in the
head, at sufficiently close range to cause powder burns,
while the victim was dazed or unconscious from a blow
on the head severe enough to fracture his skull. That
such a killing is a homicide with malice aforethought is
the only conclusion consistent with reason.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent believes that all of defendant's assignments of error have been answered and shown to be
groundless. The court is urged that defendant was aecorded a fair and lawful trial at which he was well defended. The jury had ample basis for its verdict and
could in truth have been more severe than they were.
Defendant has no just complaint. The judgment should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
JOHN W. HORSLEY
Assistant Attorney General
CUSTIS E. CALDERWOOD
District Attorney,
First District
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